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OPERATING LEVERAGE AND THE INTERACTION BETWEEN
ABANDONMENT OPTIONS AND EXOTIC HEDGING
KIT PONG WONG
School of Economics and Finance, University of Hong Kong
Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong, China
kpwong@econ.hku.hk
This paper examines the interaction between operational and financial hedging in the
context of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty. The firm is endowed
with an abandonment option in that its production decision is made after the true
realization of the random output price has been observed. If the realized output price
is less than its marginal cost, the firm optimally exercises its abandonment option and
ceases from production. Otherwise, the firm lets its abandonment option extinguish
and produces at its capacity. The existence of the abandonment option is shown to
induce the firm to opt for a concave payoff risk-sharing rule that can be perfectly
replicated by writing call options with a single strike price set equal to the marginal
cost. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions that ensure a positive (negative)
effect of operational hedging via the abandonment option on the firm’s optimal operating
leverage. In contrast, we show that the effect of financial hedging via customized exotic
derivatives on the firm’s optimal operating leverage is unambiguously positive. These
results suggest that the interaction between abandonment options and exotic hedging
is multi-dimensional and deserves further scrutiny.
Keywords: Operating leverage; abandonment options; exotic hedging.
1. Introduction
The concept of real options is the analysis of investment decisions taking into account the
ability to revise future operating decisions (McDonald, 2003). Examples of real options
include, but are not limited to, options to abandon, options to defer, options to expand,
and options to contract. In a survey conducted by Triantis and Borison (2001), managers
reveal that they use real options as an analytical tool, as a language and framing device for
investment problems, and as an organizational process.
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The purpose of this paper is to study the interaction between operational hedging via
real options and financial hedging via customized exotic derivatives. To this end, we in-
corporate abandonment options into Sandmo’s (1971) model of the competitive firm under
output price uncertainty.1 Succinctly, the firm is endowed with an abandonment option
in that the firm makes its production decision after observing the true realization of the
random output price. When the realized output price is less than its marginal cost, the
firm optimally exercises its abandonment option and ceases from production. The firm lets
its abandonment option extinguish, thereby producing at the maximum level allowed by its
production capacity, only when the realized output price exceeds its marginal cost. The ex
post exercising of the abandonment option as such convexifies the firm’s ex ante profit with
respect to the random output price.
We endogenize the firm’s operating leverage and its production capacity as functions of
the investment in fixed costs engaged prior to the resolution of the output price uncertainty.
By definition, operating leverage measures the percentage change in net operating income
for a given percentage change in sales. Since operating leverage increases as fixed costs rise
and as variable costs fall (Ross et al., 2005, p. 327), we specify the firm’s operating leverage
in a reduced form by a constant marginal cost that decreases with the investment in fixed
costs. Production capacity, on the other hand, is defined by a maximum level of output up
to which the firm can produce. This maximum level of output increases with the investment
in fixed costs.
To examine how the firm’s operating leverage, and thus its investment in fixed costs, is
affected by the interaction between operational and financial hedging, we allow the firm to
avail itself of fairly priced exotic derivatives for hedging purposes. We refer to this as “exotic
hedging.” We show that the firm optimally tailors its customized exotic derivative contract
in a way that the hedged profit is stabilized at the expected level, thereby eliminating all
1The extant literature on the theory of the competitive firm typically assumes that the firm makes its
production decision prior to the resolution of output price uncertainty (see, e.g., Batra and Ullah, 1974;
Chavas, 1985; Wong, 1996; to name just a few). That means, even when the realized output price is lower
than its marginal cost, the firm would not optimally cease from production. Alternatively put, the firm as
such possesses no options to abandon.
Interaction between Abandonment Options and Exotic Hedging 3
output price risk.2 We also show that this optimal exotic derivative contract can be perfectly
replicated by writing call options with a single strike price set equal to the marginal cost.
The effect of operational hedging via the abandonment option on the firm’s optimal
operating leverage is a priori indeterminate. It depends on the elasticity of the operating
leverage and that of the production capacity with respect to the investment in fixed costs.
The presence of the abandonment option induces the firm to increase (decrease) its optimal
operating leverage if the production capacity is sufficiently more (not too) elastic relative to
the operating leverage with respect to the investment in fixed costs. In contrast, the effect of
financial hedging via customized exotic derivatives on the firm’s optimal operating leverage
is unambiguously positive. These findings show that the interaction between abandonment
options and exotic hedging is multi-dimensional and depends on how we scrutinize it.
Robichek and Van Horne (1967) are the first to point out the importance of abandonment
options to capital budgeting. McDonald and Siegel (1985) examine how the presence of
abandonment options affects the valuation of firms. Myers and Majd (1990) propose a
procedure that links a project’s economic life to its performance taking into account its
abandonment value. This paper is closest in the spirit of Ware and Winter (1988), Moschini
and Lapan (1992), and Wong (2004). Ware and Winter (1988) consider the competitive
exporting firm under exchange rate uncertainty such that the firm possesses the ex post
flexibility in selling to either the domestic market or a foreign market.3 The firm’s ex
ante profit denominated in the domestic currency is shown to be convex in the random
exchange rate due to the ex post exercising of the option to export. While the strike price
of the exporting option in Ware and Winter (1988) is exogenously given, the strike price of
the abandonment option in this paper is endogenously determined. This explains why the
presence of the real option has an ambiguous effect on investment in our setting but always
enhances production in Ware and Winter (1988).
Moschini and Lapan (1992) study the competitive firm under output price uncertainty
2This is analogous to a well-known result in the insurance literature that a risk-averse individual fully
insures at an actuarially fair price (Mossin, 1968).
3See also Eldor and Zilcha (1987), Broll and Wahl (1997), and Wong (2001, 2003) for the study of the
behavior of export-flexible firms under exchange rate uncertainty.
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such that the firm possesses the ex post flexibility in adjusting its production decision. Our
model is certainly a special case of theirs as Moschini and Lapan (1992) allow continuous
adjustments to output while we only allow a binary choice of output. To achieve better
hedging performance, Moschini and Lapan (1992) show that the production-flexible firm
opts for more complicated hedging strategies involving the use of straddles.4
In a similar vein, Wong (2004) examines the behavior of the competitive firm under
output price uncertainty in the presence of an abandonment option, where the firm is
restricted to use forward/futures contracts for hedging purposes. The major concern of
Wong’s (2004) paper is on the robustness of the celebrated separation and full-hedging
theorems emanated from the hedging literature (Danthine, 1978; Holthausen, 1979; and
Feder et al., 1980). The separation theorem states that the production decision of the
competitive firm is affected neither by the risk attitude of the firm nor by the incidence of
the output price uncertainty should the firm have access to a forward/futures market. The
full-hedging theorem states that the firm should completely eliminate its output price risk
exposure by adopting a full-hedge if the forward/futures market is unbiased. This paper, in
contrast, focuses on how the interaction between operational and financial hedging affects
the firm’s optimal operating leverage. In addition, unlike Wong (2004) that exclusively
looks at forward/futures hedging, we impose no restriction on the set of hedging instruments
available to the firm. Thus, our consideration of exotic hedging gives rise to a first-best
risk-sharing rule catering to the firm’s hedging need.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates our model of the
competitive firm under output price uncertainty wherein an abandonment option is incor-
porated. To hedge against the output price risk, the firm can trade customized exotic
derivatives. Section 3 characterizes the firm’s optimal operating leverage and exotic deriva-
tive contract. Section 4 examines the effect of operational hedging via the abandonment
option on the firm’s optimal operating leverage. Section 5 goes on to examine the effect of
financial hedging via customized exotic derivatives on the firm’s optimal operating leverage.
4See Chang and Wong (2003) for sufficient conditions under which the use of straddles is optimal for
cross-hedging purposes.
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Section 6 concludes. All proofs of propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
2. The Model
Consider a variant model of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty a` la
Sandmo (1971). There is one period with three dates (indexed by t = 0, 1, and 2). The
riskless rate of interest is known and constant for the period. As such, we suppress the
interest factors to simplify notation in that all cash flows are compounded to their future
values at t = 2.
At t = 0, the firm chooses its investment in fixed costs, i, that determines the operating
leverage as well as the production capacity proffered to the firm. Succinctly, the operating
leverage is expressed in a reduced form by a constant marginal cost, c(i), where c′(i) ≤ 0
and c′′(i) ≥ 0. Given this specification, an increase in i is tantamount to an increase in the
operating leverage (Ross et al., 2005, p. 327). The production capacity, on the other hand,
is defined by a maximum level of output, q¯(i), up to which the firm can produce, where
q¯′(i) ≥ 0 and q¯′′(i) ≤ 0.
The output price uncertainty is modeled by a random variable, p˜, which denotes the
prevailing output price at t = 2.5 This random variable is distributed according to a
probability density function, g(p), and a cumulated distribution function, G(p), over support
[p, p], where 0 < p < p <∞. Let E(·), E(·|·), and Cov(·, ·) be the unconditional expectation
operator, the conditional expectation operator, and the covariance operator with respect to
g(p), respectively.
To hedge against its exposure to the output price risk, the firm avails itself of customized
exotic derivatives at t = 0. The payoff of an exotic derivative contract at t = 2 is delineated
by a function, θ(p), whose functional form is chosen by the firm at t = 0. To focus on the
hedging motive, vis-a`-vis the speculative motive, of the firm, we assume that the contract
is fairly priced in that E[θ(p˜)] = 0. That is, we interpret θ(p) as net of the price of the
5Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde (∼) while their realizations do not.
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contract.
At t = 1, the firm privately observes the true realization of the prevailing output price
at t = 2. Based upon this observation, the firm makes its production decision according to
the operating leverage and production capacity that have already been set up at t = 0.
Figure 1 depicts how the sequence of events unfolds in the model.
0 1 2
The firm makes its
investment and
hedging decisions.
The firm privately observes the
true realization of the output
price at t = 2 and makes its
production decision.
The firm sells its
output and settles
its hedge position.
Fig. 1. Time line.
The firm is an expected utility maximizer and possesses a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function, u(pi), defined over its profit at t = 2, pi. The firm is risk averse so that
u′(pi) > 0 and u′′(pi) < 0.6 The sequential decision problems of the firm can be solved by
using backward induction.
At t = 1, after privately observing the true realization of the prevailing output price at
t = 2, the firm makes its production decision under certainty:
max
0≤q≤q¯(i)
u{[p− c(i)]q− i+ θ(p)}, (1)
6For privately held, owner-managed firms, risk-averse behavior prevails. Even for publicly listed firms,
managerial risk aversion (Stulz, 1984), corporate taxes (Smith and Stulz, 1985), costs of financial distress
(Smith and Stulz, 1985), and capital market imperfections (Stulz, 1990; and Froot et al., 1993) all imply
a concave objective function for firms, thereby justifying the use of risk aversion as an approximation. See
Tufano (1996) for evidence that managerial risk aversion is a rationale for corporate risk management in the
gold mining industry.
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where i and θ(p) are taken as given because they have been chosen at t = 0. Since the
firm’s profit function is linear in q as evident from program (1), the optimal production
decision is characterized by a bang-bang solution: If p > c(i), the firm produces at the
maximum level, q¯(i); if p < c(i), the firm ceases from production.7 The firm as such
possesses an abandonment option that is exercised whenever the realized output price is
below the marginal cost. We can compactly write the firm’s random profit at t = 2 as
pi(p) = max [p− c(i), 0]q¯(i)− i+ θ(p). (2)
Thus, the ex post exercising of the abandonment option convexifies the firm’s ex ante profit
with respect to the random output price.
Anticipating its optimal production decision at t = 1, the firm chooses its investment in
fixed costs, i, and a fairly priced exotic derivative contract, θ(p), at t = 0 so as to maximize
the expected utility of its random profit at t = 2:
max
i, θ(p)
E{u[pi(p˜)]} s.t. E[θ(p˜)] = 0, (3)
where pi(p) is defined in equation (2).
3. Optimal Investment and Hedging Decisions








u′[pi∗(p)]{[p− c(i∗)]q¯′(i∗)− c′(i∗)q¯(i∗)− 1}g(p) dp = 0, (4)
u′[pi∗(p)]− λ∗ = 0 for all p ∈ [p, p], (5)
7The firm is indifferent between producing at its maximum capacity or abandoning its production when
p = c(i), which occurs with probability zero.
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where equation (4) follows from Leibniz’s rule, λ is the Lagrange multiplier, and an asterisk
(∗) indicates an optimal level.8
Proposition 1. If the competitive firm possessing the abandonment option is allowed to use
fairly priced exotic derivatives for hedging purposes, the firm’s optimal operating leverage,
thereby its optimal investment in fixed costs, i∗, solves
∫ p
c(i∗)
{[p− c(i∗)]q¯′(i∗)− c′(i∗)q¯(i∗)}g(p) dp− 1 = 0, (6)
and the optimal exotic derivative contract, θ∗(p), is given by
θ∗(p) = {ν∗ −max [p− c(i∗), 0]}q¯(i∗), (7)
where ν∗ = E{max [p˜− c(i∗), 0]}.
To see the intuition of Proposition 1, we write equation (2) as
pi(p) = E{max [p˜− c(i), 0]}q¯(i)− i
+θ(p)−
{
E{max [p˜− c(i), 0]} −max [p− c(i), 0]}
}
q¯(i). (8)
It is evident from equation (8) that the firm’s investment in fixed costs, i, affects its output
price risk exposure through the last term on the right-hand side of equation (8). Suppose
that the firm ignores the marginal risk effect of its investment in fixed costs on this term.
The optimal operating leverage, and thus the optimal investment in fixed costs, i∗, is then
chosen to maximize E{max [p˜−c(i), 0]}q¯(i)− i, thereby yielding equation (6). When i = i∗
and θ(p) = θ∗(p), the final term on the right-hand side of equation (8) vanishes and thus
can be ignored. Hence, i∗ and θ∗(p) are indeed the optimal solution to the firm’s ex ante
decision problem.
8The second-order conditions for program (3) are satisfied given risk aversion and the assumed properties
of c(i) and q¯(i).
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Two remarks are in order. First, the firm tailors the exotic derivative contract, θ(p), in a
way that its hedged profit at t = 2 is stabilized at the expected level, thereby eliminating all
output price risk. Second, according to equation (7), the optimal exotic derivative contract
can be easily replicated by writing q¯(i∗) units of the call option contracts with the strike
price set equal to c(i∗). Due to the fact that the firm’s unhedged profit at t = 2 is piece-wise
linear with a kink at c(i), one single option contract suffices to perfectly track this payoff
structure.9
4. The Effect of Abandonment Options on Operating Leverage
To examine the effect of operational hedging via the abandonment option on the firm’s
optimal operating leverage, we consider the hypothetical case wherein the abandonment
option is absent. That is, the firm is obliged to produce at its maximum capacity irrespective
of the true realization of the prevailing output price at t = 2 privately observed by the firm
at t = 1. In this case, the firm’s random profit at t = 2 is given by
p¯i(p) = [p− c(i)]q¯(i)− i+ θ(p). (9)
At t = 0, the firm chooses its investment in fixed costs, i, and a fairly priced exotic




E{u[p¯i(p˜)]} s.t. E[θ(p˜)] = 0, (10)




u′[p¯i0(p˜)]{[p˜− c(i0)]q¯′(i0)− c′(i0)q¯(i0)− 1}
}
= 0, (11)
9In general, Carr and Madan (2001) show that it is always feasible to construct a portfolio of options
with a continuum of strike prices that perfectly tracks any payoff structure of a firm under a single source
of uncertainty. See also Wong (2003).
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u′[p¯i0(p)]− µ0 = 0 for all p ∈ [p, p], (12)
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier, and a nought (0) indicates an optimal level.10
Proposition 2. If the competitive firm possessing no abandonment options is allowed to use
fairly priced exotic derivatives for hedging purposes, the firm’s optimal operating leverage,
thereby its optimal investment in fixed costs, i0, solves
[E(p˜)− c(i0)]q¯′(i0)− c′(i0)q¯(i0)− 1 = 0, (13)
and the optimal exotic derivative contract, θ0(p), is given by
θ0(p) = [E(p˜)− p]q¯(i0). (14)
To see the intuition of Proposition 2, we recast equation (9) as
p¯i(p) = [E(p˜)− c(i)]q¯(i)− i+ θ(p) + [p− E(p˜)]q¯(i). (15)
Inspection of equation (15) reveals that the firm could have completely eliminated its output
price risk exposure had it chosen θ(p) = [E(p˜)− p]q¯(i), which can be perfectly replicated by
a full-hedge via shorting q¯(i) units of the unbiased futures contracts. Alternatively put, the
degree of output price risk exposure to be assumed by the firm should be totally unrelated
to its investment decision. The optimal investment in fixed costs, i0, is then chosen to
maximize [E(p˜)−c(i)]q¯(i)− i. Equations (13) and (14) are simply the celebrated separation
and full-hedging theorems of Danthine (1978), Holthausen (1979), and Feder et al. (1980).
Proposition 3. When the competitive firm is allowed to use fairly priced exotic derivatives
for hedging purposes, the presence of the abandonment option induces the firm to raise
(lower) its optimal operating leverage, thereby its investment in fixed costs, if, and only if,
{c(i0)− E[p˜|p˜ < c(i0)]}q¯′(i0) + c′(i0)q¯(i0) > (<) 0, (16)
10The second-order conditions for program (10) are satisfied given risk aversion and the assumed properties
of c(i) and q¯(i).
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where i0 is the optimal investment in fixed costs in the absence of the abandonment option.
The sign of the left-hand side of condition (16) is a priori indeterminate and can either
be positive or be negative. To see this, suppose first that c′(i) ≡ 0. The left-hand side
of condition (16) is unambiguously positive because c(i0) > E[p˜|p˜ < c(i0)] and q¯′(i) ≥ 0.
Thus, we have i∗ > i0. On the other hand, suppose that q¯′(i) ≡ 0. In this case, the left-hand
side of condition (16) becomes unambiguously negative since c′(i) ≤ 0. It then follows that
i∗ < i0.
To interpret condition (16), we consider the case wherein c′(i0) < 0 and q¯′(i0) > 0.11











Note that −c(i0)/i0c′(i0) is the reciprocal of the elasticity of the operating leverage with
respect to the investment in fixed costs. Likewise, q¯(i0)/i0q¯′(i0) is the reciprocal of the
elasticity of the production capacity with respect to the investment in fixed costs. Condi-
tion (17) says that the presence of the abandonment option induces the firm to increase
(decrease) its optimal operating leverage if the production capacity is sufficiently more (not
too) elastic relative to the operating leverage with respect to the investment in fixed costs.
The intuition of Proposition 3 is as follows. Equations (2) and (9) imply that
pi(p) = p¯i(p) + max [c(i)− p, 0]q¯(i). (18)
In the absence of the abandonment option, it follows from Proposition 2 that the optimal
investment in fixed costs, i0, is chosen to maximize [E(p˜)−c(i)]q¯(i)− i. However, if the firm
possesses the abandonment option, there is an additional positive term on the right-hand
11The case wherein c′(i0) = 0 or q¯′(i0) = 0 has been discussed before.
12Since p < E[p˜|p˜ < c(i0)] < c(i0), we have
0 < − p
c′(i0)i0







Thus, condition (17) may hold in either direction.
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side of equation (18), max [c(i)− p, 0]q¯(i), which depends on i. Since q¯′(i) ≥ 0, for c(i)
fixed, to increase this additional gain due to the abandonment option, the firm is induced
to invest beyond i0. On the other hand, since c′(i) ≤ 0, for q¯(i) fixed, to increase this
additional gain due to the abandonment option, the firm is induced to invest below i0.
In general, when both c(i) and q¯(i) vary with i, the above two effects act in the opposite
directions. Hence, it is a priori indeterminate whether the firm invests more or less than i0
so as to take advantage of the presence of the abandonment option.
5. The Effect of Exotic Hedging on Operating Leverage
Now, we want to examine the effect of financial hedging via customized exotic derivatives
on the firm’s optimal operating leverage. To this end, we consider the hypothetical case
wherein the firm is banned from engaging in risk management. That is, we set θ(p) ≡ 0
and thus the firm’s random profit at t = 2 is given by
pˆi(p) = max [p− c(i), 0]q¯(i)− i. (19)
Anticipating its optimal production decision at t = 1, the firm chooses its investment in













u′[pˆi(p)]{[p− c(i)]q¯′(i)− c′(i)q¯(i)− 1}g(p) dp = 0, (21)
where equation (21) follows from Leibniz’s rule and a diamond () indicates an optimal
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level.13
Proposition 4. If the competitive firm possessing the abandonment option is banned from
engaging in risk management, its optimal operating leverage depends on its risk preferences
as well as on the underlying output price uncertainty. Furthermore, introducing customized
exotic derivatives to the firm for hedging purposes induces the firm to raise its optimal
operating leverage, thereby its investment in fixed costs. That is, i < i∗.
To see the intuition of Proposition 4, we write equation (19) as
p¯i(p) = E{max [p˜− c(i), 0]}q¯(i)− i
+
{
max [p− c(i), 0]− E{max [p˜− c(i), 0]}
}
q¯(i). (22)
The last term on the right-hand side of equation (22) is random and has mean zero. Since
the firm is banned from engaging in risk management, this random noise term can only be
controlled by varying i. Given risk aversion, it is thus optimal for the firm to invest less
than i∗, a result in line with that of Sandmo (1971).
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the interaction between operational and financial hedging
in the context of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty a` la Sandmo (1971).
The firm’s operating leverage and its production capacity are endogenously determined by
the investment in fixed costs engaged prior to the resolution of the output price uncertainty.
The firm is endowed with an abandonment option in that the firm makes its production
decision after observing the true realization of the random output price. The firm optimally
exercises the abandonment option when the realized output price is less than its marginal
13The second-order condition for program (20) is satisfied given risk aversion and the assumed properties
of c(i) and q¯(i).
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cost. In this case, no production is undertaken. On the other hand, when the realized
output price exceeds its marginal cost, the firm optimally lets its abandonment option
extinguish and produces at the maximum level allowed by its production capacity. The ex
post exercising of the abandonment option as such convexifies the firm’s ex ante profit with
respect to the random output price.
We have shown that the convexity due to the presence of the abandonment option
induces the firm to opt for a concave payoff risk-sharing rule that can be perfectly repli-
cated by writing call options with a single strike price set equal to the marginal cost. We
have derived necessary and sufficient conditions that ensure a positive (negative) effect of
operational hedging via the abandonment option on the firm’s optimal operating lever-
age. In contrast, we have shown that the effect of financial hedging via customized exotic
derivatives on the firm’s optimal operating leverage is unambiguously positive. These find-
ings thus suggest that the interaction between abandonment options and exotic hedging is
multi-dimensional and depends on how we scrutinize it.
While we have focused on abandonment options, the analysis of this paper should be
applicable to other real options embedded in investment decisions. Given the prevalence of
real options, how operational and financial hedging are interrelated warrants more studies.
We leave this challenge for future research.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
It is evident from equation (5) that max [p − c(i∗), 0]q¯(i∗) − i∗ + θ∗(p) = u′−1(λ∗) for all
p ∈ [p, p], where u′−1(λ∗) is a constant. It then follows from E[θ∗(p˜)] = 0 that u′−1(λ∗) =
ν∗ q¯(i∗) − i∗, thereby implying equation (7). Substituting equation (7) into equation (4)
yields equation (6). 2
B. Proof of Proposition 2
It is evident from equation (12) that [p − c(i0), 0]q¯(i0) − i0 + θ0(p) = u′−1(µ0) for all
p ∈ [p, p], where u′−1(µ0) is a constant. It then follows from E[θ0(p˜)] = 0 that u′−1(µ0) =
[E(p˜) − c(i0)]q¯(i0) − i0, thereby implying equation (14). Substituting equation (12) into
equation (11) yields equation (13). 2
C. Proof of Proposition 3
Evaluating the left-hand side of equation (6) at i0 yields
∫ p
c(i0)
{[p− c(i0)]q¯′(i0)− c′(i0)q¯(i0)}g(p) dp− 1.
Using equation (13), the above expression reduces to
∫ c(i0)
p
{[c(i0)− p]q¯′(i0) + c′(i0)q¯(i0)}g(p) dp,
which can be stated as
{
{c(i0)− E[p˜|p˜ < c(i0)]}q¯′(i0) + c′(i0)q¯(i0)
}
G[c(i0)].
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Since G[c(i0)] > 0, it then follows from the above expression, equation (6), and the second-
order conditions for program (3) that condition (16) is the necessary and sufficient condition
for i∗ > (<) i0. 2
D. Proof of Proposition 4












{[p− c(i)]q¯′(i)− c′(i)q¯(i)}g(p) dp. (A.1)
The right-hand side of equation (A.1) can be written as
{
E{u′[pˆi(p˜)]|p˜ > c(i)} − E{u′[pˆi(p˜)]}
}
{1−G[c(i)]}c′(i)q¯(i)
−Cov{u′[pˆi(p˜)], max [p˜− c(i), 0]}q¯′(i). (A.2)
Since pˆi(p) = max [p − c(i), 0]q¯(i) − i, we have pi(p) = −i for all p ∈ [p, c(i)] and
pi(p) = [p − c(i)]q¯(i) − i for all p ∈ (c(i), p]. It thus follows from risk aversion that
E{u′[pˆi(p˜)]|p˜ > c(i)} < E{u′[pˆi(p˜)]}. Given that 0 < G[c(i)] < 1 and c′(i) ≤ 0, the first
term of expression (A.2) is unambiguously positive.
Since pˆi(p) = max [p − c(i), 0]q¯(i) − i, we have pˆi(p) = −i for all p ∈ [p, c(i)]
and pˆi(p) = [p − c(i)]q¯(i) − i for all p ∈ (c(i), p]. There must exist a unique point,
p0 ∈ (c(i), p), such that u′[pˆi(p)] > (<) E{u′[pˆi(p˜)]} for all p < (>) p0. We can write the













[p0 − c(i)]g(p) dp q¯′(i). (A.3)
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Since q¯′(i) ≥ 0, the first term of expression (A.3) is unambiguously positive. The second
term of expression (A.3) can be written as
{
E{u′[pˆi(p˜)]} − E{u′[pˆi(p˜)]|p˜ > c(i)}
}
[p0 − c(i)]{1− G[c(i)]}q¯′(i).
Since E{u′[pˆi(p˜)]|p˜ > c(i)} < E{u′[pˆi(p˜)]}. p0 > c(i), 0 < G[c(i)] < 1, and q¯′(i) ≥ 0,
this term is also unambiguously positive.
Since the right-hand side of equation (A.1) is positive and E{u′[pˆi(p˜)]} > 0, inspection
of equation (A.1) reveals that
∫ p
c(i)
{[p− c(i)]q¯′(i)− c′(i)q¯(i)}g(p) dp− 1 > 0.
It then follows from equation (6) and the second-order conditions for program (3) that
i∗ > i. 2
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